Predestination and the Metaphysics of Identity: A Yoruba (African) Case Study
Predestination and the Metaphysics of Identity: A Yoruba (African) Case
Study
Yunusa Kehinde Salami
Credit: Prof L. O. Adewole
Yoruba for academic purpose
Abstract
Predestination, as a metaphysical issue, carries the idea of prenatal
choice or ascription of the purpose or end to which any person or thing is
created. Destiny, as chosen by or ascribed to a person represents what the
person has to unwind in the world. In Yoruba account of predestination, a
moulded body, already infused with the spirit of life by Olodumare (the supreme
being), goes to pick an Orí (the bearer of destiny). Sometimes, such a destiny
is considered imposed on the self. The destiny, so chosen or so ascribed or
imposed, encapsulates the successes and failures which the human being is meant
to unravel during his or her course of existence in this world.
Considering some
arguments on the metaphysical question of personal identity, the paper observes
that it will be difficult to establish a case of personal identity between the person who chose a
destiny in ìsálú ọ̀run (heavenly
abode) and the one who is assumed to be unravelling it in this ìsálú ayé (earthly world). The paper
concludes that it will be difficult to establish a case for predestination if a
relationship of identity cannot be easily established between the two entities.
Introduction
Predestination, as a metaphysical issue, carries the
idea of prenatal choice or an ascription of purpose or end to which any person
or thing is created. Destiny as chosen by or ascribed to a person represents
what the person has to unwind in this world. In Yoruba account of
predestination, a moulded body, already infused with the spirit of life by Olódùmarè, goes to pick an Orí (the bearer of destiny). Sometimes,
such a destiny or Orí is considered imposed on the self. The destiny,
so chosen or so ascribed or imposed, encapsulates the successes and failures
which the human being is meant to unravel during his or her course of existence
in this world.
The
question may be raised concerning the identity of the being that chose a
destiny or upon whom a destiny was imposed in heaven, and the human being, on
earth, who is expected to manifest or actualise the destiny. Unless the
relationship of identity can be established between the two entities, it may be
difficult, if at all, to talk of predestination.
Given some arguments on personal identity, it seems problematic to
establish the position that a specific human being was prenatally destined to
do some things and not others while on earth. The interest of this paper is to
examine the possibility of identity between the person who is acclaimed to have
chosen a destiny in heaven and the one who is saddled with the responsibility
of unravelling the destiny on earth.
Yoruba Account of Predestination
In the Yoruba conception of human person[i], a
human person is made of ara, ẹ̀mí and orí. Ara is body, ẹ̀mi is soul while orí
is the inner head. Orí (the inner head) is regarded as the bearer of destiny.
This account of human person emphasizes the importance of ori and by
implication, makes destiny or predestination a necessary component of a human
person. With this introduction of ‘orí’,
the third component, there is a challenge to the Cartesian dualist account of
human person. This gives a tripartite conception of human person as against the
dualist account of Descartes.
Yoruba generally refer to ori as the unconscious self, as
inner head, as one’s guardian spirit, and as the bearer of destiny. According
to Gbadegesin, “…it is the ori that selects the destiny of the person
before Olódùmarè (the Supreme deity) who normally endorses such a
choice”[ii]. Another account of Yoruba concept of ori ́is given by Idowu, who claims that
Yoruba regard orí as the personality Spirit. For Idowu, orí “is
the very essence of personality…it is this orí that rules, controls,
and guides the ‘life’ and activities of the person”[iii]. Going by Idowu and other available materials
on orí and destiny, a person’s
destiny can be known as ìpín-orí or
shortened. This can be translated as
the orí’s portion or lot. Ìpín means portion, and orí means the inner head. So, ìpín orí means ori’s portion or lot.
The
question, however, is about the status of orí vis-à-vis other causal
agents. Can we regard orí as the antecedent cause of all other possible
causes? In other words, do we see other causes as mere causal manifestations of
one underlying cause - orí? If the answer is yes, then we can correctly
argue that there is a connection between the Yoruba concept of orí and
destiny. This takes us to the other related Yoruba notions of ìpín
(that which is allocated to someone), àyànmọ́ (that which is affixed
to someone), and àkúnlẹ̀yàn (that which is chosen kneeling). All of
these concepts convey the idea of destiny which, if critically examined, could
be seen to convey some important differences. For Idowu, “… we have a
trimophous conception of destiny.”[iv]
Going by these related terms, a little clarification may be warranted.
For instance, àyànmọ́ and ìpín imply something that was
imposed on human persons, without any enquiry on whether they wanted it or not.
Àyànmọ́ and ìpín are predominantly suggestive of the
influence of an external factor against which we are powerless. Consequently,
one may, it seems to me, argue that what becomes one’s destiny is not within
one’s ability to choose. Given this account, the action one finds oneself
performing here on earth, is independent of one’s choice or wishes in this
world. The account renders human beings as mere toys in the hands of the gods.
On the other hand, àkúnlẹ̀yàn is suggestive of one’s conscious
choice, most probably, without any external compulsion. In spite of these
differences in Yoruba conceptions of predestination, a person comes into the
world with his destiny doubly sealed, and whatever a person does achieve, or
whatever happens to him, is a precise working out of his destiny. [v]
The
upshot of this is that in Yoruba universe, each human being is predestined to
lead a kind of life and not others. That is, each human being while in ìsálú
ọ̀run (heavenly abode), chose or found affixed on him or her, a particular
kind of destiny which he or she is expected to actualise, unravel, or manifest
in this ìsálú ayé (earthly
world). On this account, destiny represents the kind of choice or affixation in
ìsálú ọ̀run which will invariably determine the earthly success or failure.
It is believed that the choice or affixation of a good orí ensures
that the individual concerned would lead a successful and prosperous life on
earth, while the choice or affixation of a bad orí condemns the
individual concerned to a life of failure.[vi]
Yoruba Account of Predestination and Problem of Personal Identity
The problem of ‘Personal identity’ arose because a
human person is not stationary either in space or in time. Many a time, when a
person exists at any particular time and space, we also consider him or her
with himself or herself at an earlier or later time and space. When we see
anyone at a particular space and time, it is always clear to us that he is
himself and not another person who at the same time exists at the same time in
another place, whatever feature they share in common. In this case, ‘Personal
identity’ invokes a relation between a person who is known to exist at one
time, and a person who is known to have existed at another time.[vii]
Identity in this sense presupposes “an uninterrupted continuance of existence”[viii].
The reasoning here according to Reid, is that;
that which has
ceased to exist cannot be the same with that which afterward begins to exist;
for this would be to suppose a being to exist after it ceased to exist, and to
have had existence before it was produced.[ix]
The point now is that given the problem of personal
identity, questions can be raised about the identity between the entity that
chose a destiny or upon whom a destiny was imposed in heaven and the entity
that is unravelling this destiny here on earth. For instance, it will interest
philosophers to know whether the figure who picked a destiny or upon whom a
destiny was affixed at ìsálú ọ̀run is the same person as, or,
identical to, the human being who is in this ìsálú ayé unravelling the earlier chosen or affixed destiny.
Can a case of uninterrupted continual existence be established between the two
entities?
It is
important to note that unless there is an identity between the body which chose
a destiny, or on which a destiny was affixed, and the person whose life
manifests the destiny, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to talk of
predestination and the later unravelling of such a destiny. My point is that if
there is actually no identity or sameness, the talk of destiny or predestination
becomes otiose. This takes us to the discussion on what the idea of personal
identity entails. In other words, what properties or qualities should be
obtained in order to establish personal identity?
Philosophers have variously attempted to tackle the problem of personal
identity. The problem of personal identity, like all other metaphysical
problems, has almost been intractable. While most philosophers tend to agree
that personal identity involves an uninterrupted continual existence, they
differ on what it is that uninterruptedly continues to exist. What each
philosopher takes as the subject of uninterrupted continual existence depends
largely on his or her general metaphysical standpoint on the question of the
ultimate constituent of personhood.
While for some, mind or soul (mental event), is the essential component
of a person, some others argue that body or the physical is the essential
constituent of personhood. The third possibility is to talk of person as
person, that is, a person as the aggregation of all the components. This third
position argues that a person is a whole entity, an indivisible whole. This
means that a person cannot be divided into body on one part and mind on the
other.
For
those who consider mind, soul, or the mental aspect as the essential element of
a person, personal identity requires sameness of consciousness, remembrance or
memory. While a variant of this version strictly maintains that sameness of
consciousness is all that is required for personal identity, some other variant
argues that sameness of consciousness must be conjoined to sameness of body in
order to allow for talk of personal identity.
For
the strict memory thesis, personal identity holds and different person-stages
belong to the same person if and only if the later could contain an experience
which is a memory of a reflective awareness of an experience contained in the
earlier.[x]
For John Locke, for instance;
… since
consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that which makes everyone
to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, i.e.; the sameness
of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards
to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person…[xi]
In this passage, Locke makes reflective consciousness
the basis for personal identity. By reflective consciousness, Locke meant the
conscious act of introspection through which a person critically looks inward
and reflects on his or her experiences. For Locke, a person who, through
introspection, is able to link the series of experiences at the different
levels of his person-stages is identical to the person of the different
person-stages.
A
Quintonian reformulation of Locke’s
memory thesis can be read to mean that there is a sequence of person-stages
(not necessarily in the order they occur in time and not excluding
repetitions), the first of which is A and the last of which is B, such that
each person-stage in the sequence either (i) contains or could contain a memory
of an experience contained in the next or (ii) contains an experience of which
the next person-stage contains a memory, or could contain a memory.[xii]
In
spite of the criticisms against this thesis on personal identity, the emphasis
is on the continuance in the memory chain of experiences attributable to same
individual. As this argument goes, personal identity arises when a person at a
point in time can link his or her present experience to a whole sequence of
past memory chains.
One problem is that not
all philosophers would base personal identity on sameness of memory or
consciousness. Some maintain that sameness of consciousness must be conjoined
to sameness of body in order to have personal identity. For the proponents of
this second view, sameness of consciousness and bodily identity are both
important criteria to personal identity. Thus, the argument goes, neither of
both can be regarded as the sole criterion of personal identity. It is in line
with this view that Sydney Shoemaker maintains that:
… whether or not memory is a criterion of personal
identity, it is not the criterion… it cannot be the sole criterion that we use
in making identity statements about other persons… Bodily identity is certainly
a criterion of personal identity…But I do not think that it can be the sole
criterion…[xiii]
While these two positions emphasise sameness of
consciousness and or bodily identity, there is another position that emphasises
the necessary presence of some underlying substances for personal identity to
obtain. Yet, some other scholars consider the talk of personal identity a
misdirection of energy.[xiv]
These
positions are quite relevant to our discussion of predestination and personal
identity. The issue to be examined is whether the chooser or the one who picked
the orí in Ìsálú-ọ̀run
( heavenly abode) is
identical to the one who is supposed to be unravelling the destiny here in Ìsálú-ayé
(earthly world). The point is that if personal identity between the one who
picked an orí in heaven and the person meant to unravel what the orí
portends here on earth cannot be established, then, questions about
predestination will easily dissolve because there would not be any talk of
identity between the two different personalities.
Looking at the position that emphasizes the significance of an underlying
substance in the determination of personal identity, there is the problem of
determining what the substance (that which I know not what)[xv]
is, or can be taken to mean. If we grant the existence of the substance, there
is the problem of how to identify it. Greater still is the problem of using
what cannot be identified as the link between one person-stage and the other.
To
serve as a criterion for personal identity, the criterion itself must be
identifiable. Since substance, the underlying substratum is something
unknowable, or at least, something ‘I know not what’, it cannot be the basis
for an empirical question of personal identity. After all, unless we know what
the substance is, we would not know whether the different person-stages share the
same substance or not. Since sameness must be sameness of something, it stands
to reason that the sameness of something ‘I know not what’ cannot be
determined, and so unhelpful in the resolution of the problem of personal
identity.
A
critical consideration of the problems associated with the earlier accounts of
personal identity as discussed within the Western theories, suggests that it
may be more productive to explore some Ifá
verses to articulate a Yoruba account of the identity of the person who chose
an orí, or upon whom an orí was imposed in Ìsálú ọ̀run (heaven).
This will enable us address the question of rationality as raised by some
anthropologists and philosophers who question the rationality of African beliefs.
Perhaps the most influential exponents of the view that African thought system
is prelogical, prescientific and unphilosophical were Levy-Bruhl, Rev Fr
Placide Tempels, Rev Fr Alexis Kagame, and Robin Horton, among others.16
These
scholars, in different ways, represent the modernist tendency to universalize
culture, disregard difference and reduce the specific to the general. For
instance, Robin Horton argues that African traditional thought was
unphilosophical because it did not meet the analytic ideal of Western
philosophy. His conclusion was rested on the misconceptions of philosophy as
empirical science and as nothing but logic and epistemology17. The
view common to the scholars is that African traditional thought is
unphilosophical because (i) it does not meet the analytic ideal of Western
philosophy and (ii) it consists of unverifiable statements. This modernist and
Universalist approach has been variously tackled by both African and
non-African scholars18.
This
paper rejects Horton’s view that adopts analytic rigor and empiricism as the
sole standard of Philosophy. The fact that some aspects of African thought
consist of unverifiable statements does not make it less philosophical than
Metaphysics, existentialism, ethics, and aesthetics. Logical positivism which
adopts analytic rigor and empiricism as the sole standard of Philosophy has
been variously discredited even by some logical positivists. The lesson from
this is that it will be question-begging to use analytic rigor as the telescope
and yardstick for measuring the existence and status of African, Oriental, or
any non-western thought or philosophy. It cannot be correctly argued that there
are any systems of human thought in which the principles of logic are never
employed in reasoning, either consciously or unconsciously.
The
concept of Orí and destiny is well
discussed in some chapters and verses of Ifá.
The most aptly relevant verses can be found in Ògúndá Méji and Ogbègúndá
or Ogbèyọ́nu19. Relevant verses of Ifá give
the idea that individual went as a whole
person with a whole body and soul to pick orí.
The verses tell of three friends, Oríṣèékú
(the son of Ògún), Oríléémèrè (the son of Ija) and Afùwàpẹ́ (the son of Ọ̀rúnmìlà)
who were going from heaven to earth to settle down. The account involved
sacrifices by Afùwàpé (the son of Ọ̀rúnmìl̀à) before going to pick
his orí. As this account goes, this
sacrifice aided Afùwàpé’s choice
of a good and durable orí which
withstood the hazards of the journey to earth and upon which Afùwàpẹ́ became a successful man on
earth.
If
this account as recorded by Wande Abimbola (1976) and Bolaji Idowu (1962) is
granted, it may be reasonable to assume that a conjunction of sameness of
consciousness and sameness of body may be required as criteria for personal
identity in Yoruba account of predestination. In other words, the traditional
Yoruba account holds that while choosing the destiny or orí in heaven, the individuals were complete beings in terms of
the physical body and the mental consciousness. The point then is that in
determining the identity of the chooser of orí
in Ìsálú ọ̀run and the individual
meant to unravel the destiny in Ìsálú
ayé, the bodily identity as well as identity of consciousness should be
considered.
This
may raise the question of the possibility of bodily existence in ìsálú ọ̀run (heavenly abode), the
supposed abode of the spirits. If the individuals in ìsálú ọ̀run were complete human beings, it will be problematic
to account for biological processes of conception and stages of foetal
developments before the actual birth of human baby. This creates some
difficulty for the bodily identity between the chooser of destiny in ìsálú ọ̀run and the one who unravels
the destiny here in ìsálú ayé.
This
shifts the discussion to the realm of consciousness. The question now is
whether an identity can be established using the criterion of sameness of consciousness.
For those who adopt consciousness as the basis of personal identity, the
emphasis is on the capacity to reflectively connect our memory-phases. In other
words, personal identity is established between persons P1 and P2
at different times t1 and t2 if P2 at t2
can reflectively call to memory, the experiences of P1 at t1.
This, for the consciousness theorists20, is the basis for
establishing personal identity.
The
question now is, ‘can the human person, here on earth, whose responsibility it
is to unravel the destiny chosen or imposed in heaven, reflectively connect the
memory-phases of the experience of ever
choosing a particular kind of orí or destiny in heaven? Unless the
person on earth, who is meant to unravel the destiny earlier picked in heaven,
can be rationally conscious of, or recall, the memory of the experience of
choosing a particular kind of orí in heaven, it will be difficult to
say someone on earth chose one destiny or the other in heaven. After all, to
talk of a destiny belonging to a particular person is to presuppose that the
person to unravel a destiny and the one that picked the destiny both refer to
one and the same individual.
If we
go by the position that rests personal identity on consciousness or memory,
there is bound to be an initial problem. The initial problem is that it is
already contained in the Yoruba account of predestination that the chooser of
destiny in ìsálú ọ̀run (heaven) would have passed through or would
have crossed the river of forgetfulness while coming to òde-ìsálayé
(the human world) and so cannot remember or have a reflective memory of having
ever picked an orí.
The
question from this is how to link a destiny to a man who never remembered
anything or have been made to forget everything in connection with the destiny
or the fact of picking it. If the destiny and its choice are to be of principal
relevance to the life of a person, that person must be able to link himself or
his life to the destiny and its choice.
This
problem generated by the river of forgetfulness can be adequately taken care of
by the Yoruba account according to which Ifá was present at the time
when individuals were picking their individual orí21.
Based on the supposed presence of Ifá oracle, it is believed that Ifá
divination can help
to reveal the sort of orí which was chosen and, perhaps, what can be
done to change a bad one for good.
The
position assumes the authenticity of Ifá as a plausible means to the
knowledge of the transcendent. If this is granted, then, we shall also grant
the possibility of linking a person to his destiny through the revelatory
knowledge of Ifá oracle.
Given this account, it is assumed that anyone who wishes to have his destiny
revealed to him would simply seek the assistance of Ifá oracle and its
priest. This informs the practice in which the Yoruba consult Ifá at the birth of a new child to know
the àkọsẹjáyé; what the future
has in stock for the child.
One
problem with this approach is that it does not help the individual concerned to
reflectively recollect a forgotten experience. The revealed piece or pieces of
information cannot be correctly taken to be a coherent part of a cohesive
memory chain. The information from Ifá oracle is extraneous to, and
does not form a system with the past and present memory-phases of the
individual concerned.
This
can be excused on the point that to insist on the Eurocentric memory-phase
argument may be to commit the fallacy of
petitio principii or beg the question.
After all, the memory-phase argument has its own problems and it is not
itself conclusive, final or fool proof. Although the knowledge from Ifá oracle is extraneous, there is no
doubt that if Ifá is assumed to have
the capacity to make acceptable revelation of the past, it will bridge the gap
among different periods of human pasts.
In
spite of this reassuring support from the revelatory prowess of Ifá oracle, its capacity to provide the
lost memory of the past can be challenged. For instance, the question of
inter-subjective verifiability can be raised. A critic may object that the modus operandi of Ifá as a source of knowledge is not
open to the empirical methodology of verification22. It does not
allow cross-checking of facts. In fact, two Ifá priests may differ or
disagree on what Ifá says about the
destiny of a particular individual. The critic may claim further that there is
little likelihood, if any, for Ifá to provide the supposed missing link
in the memory-phases of a person P1 at t1 who picked an orí,
and by extension, destiny, and, the person P2 at t2 who
unravels the destiny as encapsulated by the orí.
This
critique of Ifá may be too hasty.
The critic may not have sufficiently explored the potentialities or efficacy of
Ifá as a means of knowing. The
method of Ifá divination should be
sufficiently explored. The possible variations that may occur about what Ifá reveals may be due to the
variations in the levels of proficiency of different Ifá priests and not necessarily a product of the limitation of Ifá oracle.
A
Yoruba predestinationist may also take relief in the Freudian psycho-analytic
theory according to which human consciousness is like an ice-berg on the
surface of an ocean. The part beneath the water surface is of greater
proportion than the one that is presented to human perception. In other words,
the unconscious and the forgotten part of human consciousness are greater in
proportion to the conscious part. Moreover, the unconscious libido,
to a very noticeable extent, constitutes the basis for human
consciousness. Freudian psycho-analysis like Plato’s account of knowledge in Meno23,
suggests that an individual would be able to recollect the forgotten part of
his consciousness with the aid of serious and methodical questioning.
The
outcome of this is that it would be wrong to deny an individual of the
forgotten phase in his memory chain simply because he could no longer recollect
such a phase. Moreover, the theory suggests some steps toward recalling such a
phase. The question to be raised is whether this Freudian account can help to
bridge this missing gap in the Yoruba account of destiny and predestination.
As
interesting as the Freudian argument may seem, it lacks the required
strength to solve this problem of destiny and personal identity. It may be
interesting to note, for instance, that Freudian psycho-analytic theory does
not represent the view of all psychologists. It is difficult to imagine how
Freudian psycho-analytic theory or Plato’s idea of knowledge as recollection
can help an individual to remember a choice of orí which he
ought to have forgotten when crossing the river of forgetfulness before coming
to this world24. It will require an infinite number of questioning
for someone to recollect experiences which, if ever existed, have been totally
erased from the memory chain. On this account, it seems a gratuitous assumption
to base a continuity of memory-phase solely on the Freudian psycho-analysis.
From
the foregoing, it can, to a large extent, be argued that an identity cannot be
easily established between the agent who picked an orí, and the actual
human being who is expected to unravel the destiny which the orí
bears. Given the fact that after picking orí, an individual had to be conceived as a foetus before coming
to the world, and probably given the uncertainty associated with conception in
case of abortion or whatever, it may be too difficult to establish a case of
physical continuity or memory sameness between the one who picked an orí and the one who is assumed to be
unravelling the destiny. If this identity cannot be established, the
idea of predestination may raise a lot of problems. After all, for
predestination to be meaningful there must be someone who is predestined. The
difficulty in establishing an identity between the person who chose a destiny
and the one who is expected to bear the consequences of the destiny makes it
difficult or impossible to identify someone with his destiny; and,
consequently, makes it difficult to strongly effect any support for the idea of
destiny and predestination.
The
idea of destiny and predestination portends some social and moral benefits for
the society and the individuals25. One cannot overlook the benefits
derived from the idea of predestination in the social and moral spheres of
life. There is no doubt that the idea of choice of orí and the destiny it
bears has enabled some traditional Yoruba indigenous thinkers to take, with
ease, the daily vicissitudes of life and to appreciate and live with the
differences in the structure of human existence. Whether or not the choice of orí
is true or accepted to be true, the traditional Yoruba believes that he
chose an orí, and also that this orí is the bearer of his
destiny. While he works hard to realise his destiny, the idea relieves him of
the agony of the inequality in the society. The traditional Yoruba respects
others and avoids offending others around who may change a good orí to a bad one.
Nevertheless, as desirable as the idea of predestination may seem, and
no matter how reassuring our reasons for desiring predestination may be it does
not make predestination real if it is actually not real.
Conclusion
This study provides a critical examination of the
metaphysical issues of destiny and predestination focusing on the Yoruba
account according to which everyone, while in heaven, picked an orí, or found imposed on him, an orí, which encapsulates the successes
and failures which the human being is meant to unravel during his course of
existence in this world. Proper consideration is given to the social and moral
benefits of the notion of predestination in regulating human activities in
Yoruba traditional culture. The upshot is that it may be difficult to establish
a case of identity between the person who is considered to have chosen a
destiny in heaven and the one who is assumed to be unravelling the destiny in
this human world.
Given this difficulty in establishing a relationship of identity between
the two personalities, one may conclude that the notion of predestination in
general and the Yoruba account in particular, is one of the metaphysical
problems that requires more than mere critical argumentation26.
1 See Abimbola Wande, La
Notion de Personne en Afrique Noire ( Paris: Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique,1971) No 544,pp73-89, Gbadegesin Olusegun, “Destiny,
Personality and the Ultimate Reality of Human Existence: A Yoruba Perspective”
in Ultimate Reality and Meaning Vol.7No.3 (1984) :173-188, Makinde M.A.,
“ An African Concept of Human Personality: The Yoruba Example” in Ultimate Reality and Meaning Vol. 7
No. 3 (1984): 189-200, Hallen Barry, “ Eniyan: A Critical Analysis of The
Yoruba Concepts of Person” in C.S. Momoh (ed.) The Substance of African Philosophy
( Auchi: African Philosophy Projects, 1989) pp328-354, Hallen Barry, The Good The Bad and The Beautiful: Discourse
About Values In Yoruba Culture (Bloomington: Indiana
UniversityPress,2000)pp45-46,Sodipo Olubi and Hallen Barry, Knowledge, Belief, and
Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy(London:Ethnographica
Publishers,1997)p105, Salami Yunusa
Kehinde, “ Human Personality And Immortality in Traditional Yoruba Cosmology”
in Africana Marburgensia XXIV, I, (1991): 4-13, Salami Yunusa Kehinde, “
Human Person, Death, Re-incarnation And Immortality, A Case in Yoruba ( African
) Metaphysics” in ODU: A Journal of West African Studies, 40, (
2000) : 207-214, among others.
[ii] Gbadegesin Olusegun, ibid. p.175
[iii] Idowu Bolaji, Olodumare: God
In Yoruba Belief ( London: Longman,1962) pp.170 and 180
[iv] Ibid.p.183. For more on this,
see Morakinyo Olufemi, “ The Ayanmo Myth And Mental Health Care In West Africa
“ in Journal Of Culture and Ideas Vol.1 (1983) :68-73
[v] See Idowu Bolaji p.194 and Salami
Yunusa Kehinde ,” Predestination , Freedom, and Responsibility: A Case in
Yoruba Moral Philosophy” in Research
in Yoruba Language and Literatures 7 (1996) :6
[vi]Abimbola Wande, Ifa : An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus (
Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1976) p.113
[vii] See Locke John, “ Of Identity and Diversity “ in Woozley A.D.
(ed.) Essay Concerning Human
Understanding( London: Fontana Library, 1964) , Quinton Anthony, “ The Soul
“ in The Journal of Philosophy,
59 No.15 (1962), Perry John (ed.) Personal Identity ( Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1975).
[viii] Reid Thomas, “ Of The Nature and
Origin of Our Notion of Personal
Identity “ in Edwards Paul and Pap Arthur (eds.) A Modern Introduction To Philosophy:
Readings From Classical and Contemporary Sources ( New York: The Free
Press, 1973 ) p.195
[ix] Reid Thomas, ibid
[x] See Locke John, “ Of Identity and Diversity”, Quinton Anthony , “ The
Soul”, in Perry John(ed) Personal Identity pp3-98
[xi] Locke John, “ Of Identity and Diversity” pp 39-40
[xii] Perry John (ed.) Personal Identity p.19
[xiii] Shoemaker Sydney, “ Personal Identity and Memory” in Perry John (ed.) Personal
Identity pp124-129
[xiv] See Butler Joseph, “ Of Personal
Identity” in Perry John, Personal Identity pp99-105,and Hume David, “ Of Personal Identity” in Perry John (ed)
Personal Identity pp161-172
[xv] Locke John, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (ed.) A. D. Woozley, ( London: Fontana
library,1964) pp185-187
16 Tempels Placide, Bantu Philosophy(Paris:
Presence Africaine, 1949), Kagame Alexis,
Rwandan-Bantu Philosophy of Being(Brussels: Academie Royale des Sciences
Coloniales, 1956), Levy-Bruhl Lucian, Notebooks
on Primitive Mentality(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), Horton Robin, “African
Traditional Thought and Western Science” in Africa
Vol.37, Nos.1-2(1967), Horton Robin,
Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: Essays on Magic, Religion and
Science(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
17 Makinde M. Akin, African Philosophy,
Culture, and Traditional Medicine (Athens: Ohio University Centre for
International Studies, 1988)p35.
18 Makinde M. Akin, pp35-39, Coetzee P.H and Roux A.P.J.(eds.) The African Philosophy Reader(London:
Routledge, 1998) chapter 3, Habermas Jurgen, Post Metaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays(Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 1992), Larrain Jorge, Ideology and
Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence(Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1994), Lukes Steven, “Some Problems about Rationality” in Martin Michael
and Mclntyre Lee(eds.) Readings in the
Philosophy of Social Science(London: MIT Press, 1994)pp285-298, Hallen
Barry, A Short History of African
Philosophy(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002)
19 Abimbola Wande, IFA: An
Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus(Ibadan: Oxford University Press Nigeria,
1976)pp 116-149, Idowu E. Bolaji, Olodumare:
God in Yoruba Belief (Ibadan: Longman Nigeria, 1996)pp 179-200
20 See Locke John, “Of Identity and
Diversity” in Perry John (ed.) Personal
Identity pp33-52, Quinton Anthony, “The Soul” in Perry John, pp53-72, Grice
H.P. “Personal Identity” in Perry John, pp73-98
21 Makinde M. Akin, “Ifa as a
Repository of Knowledge” in The
Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy(Montreal:
1983) and Makinde M. Akin, “The Yoruba Concepts of Ori and Human Destiny” in Journal of International Studies in
Philosophy(1985): 57
22 While one may not be justified
to claim that Science can provide answers to all problems it still behoves us
to say that Science has provided the most reliable source of knowledge about
the world. In some sense, the disagreement among Ifa Priests may be due to the
limitations on the parts of the Priests.
23 See Plato, “Meno”, in Jowett B.
(trans.) The Dialogues of Plato Vol.
11 “London: Oxford University Press, 1931), Taylor A.E., Plato: The Man and His Work (Edinburgh: Methuen, 1969), Bedu-Addo
J.T., “Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato’s Meno”, in American Journal of Philology
104(1983):228, Bedu-Addo J.T., “Recollection and the Argument ‘From A
Hypothesis’ in Plato’s Meno” in Journal
of Hellenic Studies IV(1984):1-14, Gulley N., Plato’s Theory of knowledge(London: Methuen, 1962)pp17-18, Harold
Zyskind and Sternfield R.,”Plato’s Meno89c: ‘Virtue is Knowledge’ a
Hypothesis?” in Phronesis
XXI(1976):130-34, and Freud Sigmund, Introductory
Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1966)
24 There are various hints in
Yoruba mythology about how human
beings were made to forget all that they
previously knew in heaven when they passed through the river of forgetfulness
just at the boundary between heaven and earth. As the myth goes, once
individuals have crossed this river, they are made to forget all they had known
earlier in heaven. There are a lot of similarities between this Yoruba account
and the accounts of several earlier Greek Philosophers including Plato.
25 Gbadegesin Olusegun, “Destiny,
Personality and the Ultimate Reality of Human Existence: A Yoruba Perspective”
in Ultimate Reality and Meaning Vol.
7, No.3 (1984): 173-188
26 Critical argumentation is the
approach that subjects acceptance or rejection of positions and findings to the
merit or demerit of argumentative reasoning devoid of emotions and personal
subjective feelings. Critical argumentation presupposes that no position is
accepted unless it is supported with adequate and convincing reasoning.
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